


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CIA/SAVA /CUVIND 721202



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending December 2, 1972*







NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

*For the President Only*

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
## SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1972  
Weekly average for each month




SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 1972  
Weekly data as reported


**US BATTLE DEATHS** remained at zero -- the same figure as last week.




**SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS** totaled 302 for the week. This figure is preliminary and may change considerably as more complete information becomes available.




**INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE** include six regular and 14 special purpose groups totaling 2,278 personnel. The estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1972 now stands at some 17,600-18,600.




**ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS** dropped to 269 from the 413 of last week.



**ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION** decreased from last week's 1,896 to 1,248.



**SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS** as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces declined to 99% from the 100% of the previous week.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

In South Vietnam, enemy-initiated activity has remained at low levels except for continued heavy attacks by fire in northern Quang Tri Province. All source intelligence suggests that most enemy units are conserving their resources of both men and materiel for a concerted last-minute effort to display a presence in as many areas as possible after a cease-fire date is finally decided upon. Recent [REDACTED] rallier reports from Military Region 4 indicate that heavy losses from Allied operations and lack of support from the local populace have caused a serious deterioration in morale among enemy units and have adversely affected Communist operations. Nevertheless, in most areas enemy units remain a viable force and will continue to pose a significant threat to the GVN both before and after a cease-fire. In the changing circumstances created by the prospect of a settlement agreement, morale problems of varying magnitude may arise in some of the military units of both sides in weeks to come. There is as yet no evidence, however -- either among enemy military forces or among ARVN units -- that these problems will be serious enough to have a major impact on either side's ability to wage political struggle.

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Military activity in Cambodia was light during the past week, but there has been some improvement in security along lines of communication with the reopening of Route 4 between Phnom Penh and Cambodia's main port of Kompong Som. Communist pressure against the provincial capital of Takeo has eased considerably, but its link to Phnom Penh -- Route 2 -- still remains closed to traffic because of heavy damage to the roadbed. The continuing growth of the communications network of the Khmer Communists points up a persistent effort on their part to extend and improve their political and administrative influence over the Cambodian countryside. So far, five and possibly six Khmer Communist regional entities have appeared in intercepted communications. In some areas, the Khmer Communist communications network may already extend down to the sub-district level.

In northern Laos, North Vietnamese forces near the Plaine des Jarres are preparing for another series of attacks against government irregulars northeast of Long Tieng. Concurrently, the Communists also continue to make preparations for an attack against the irregular enclave north of the Plaine des Jarres at Bouam Long. Reports last week indicated that 2 December was to be the kick-off date for the assault against Bouam Long, which is the last remaining irregular bastion north of the Plaine, but so far the attack has not materialized. Enemy tactical messages have also been discussing preparations for the emplacement of Soviet-made 130mm field pieces in locations from which they can be brought to bear on friendly positions northwest of the Plaine, and on Long Tieng itself. In south Laos, the battle for Muong Phalane in the central panhandle continues with friendly forces now holding the western and southern fringes of the town. To the southeast, the government task force operating in enemy territory around Saravane has again come under heavy enemy attack but is holding its own. On the Bolovens Plateau, government units have made progress toward Paksong in spite of the presence of enemy tanks in the area.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

Some 2,300 new NVA personnel destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia were detected during the week in the infiltration pipeline. This brings the estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1972 to some 17,600-18,600.

The enemy continues to import and move toward the front large quantities of supplies. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicate that at least 68,000 tons of petroleum products (POL) are scheduled for delivery to North Vietnam during the month of December. By comparison, the total of POL projected for November delivery was about 55,500 tons. Within North Vietnam itself, Hanoi has continued to ship large quantities of ammunition and weapons southward through the Panhandle -- taking advantage of the bad weather which has limited the effectiveness of air attacks against such movements below the 20th parallel. The increased flow of materiel, however -- as well as U.S. interdiction efforts -- have strained the system, and additional manpower and vehicles from the civilian sector have had to be mobilized in support of the current "transportation offensive." Logistics movements through the Lao Panhandle, on the other hand, have recently benefited from a reduced level of Allied bombing and from an improvement in the weather. Convoy movements, establishment of landlines, and redeployment of AAA units from North Vietnam have been noted as the route structure in Laos dries out.

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